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WYMAN V. JAMES
which the warrant procedure could be carried out. If the recipient re-
fuses to consent upon notice of an upcoming visit, application for a
warrant could be made. If the caseworker could articulate facts that
suggested that violations or child abuse had been committed the warrant
would issue. If not, the home visit would not be necessary. In short, the
decision should be for an impartial magistrate, not for the caseworker
in the field.
GEORGE R. HODGES
Contracts-Partial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenantst
A restrictive covenant in an employment contract which unduly
restricts the covenantor will be closely scrutinized by the courts because
it violates the public policy against restraint of trade. According to the
traditional view as stated in the Restatement of Contracts,' if the cove-
nant can be construed to be reasonable it will stand but if not2 it falls;
to do otherwise would be to rewrite the contract for the parties. In
Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co.3 the Supreme Court of Iowa has over-
ruled prior cases based on the Restatement rule and joined the growing
minority of states which have adopted the "partial-enforcement" doc-
trine long advocated by Professors Williston4 and Corbin..
The plaintiff in Ehlers, a former employee of the defendant truck
rental company, sought a declaratory judgment that two restrictive cov-
enants in his employment contract with the defendant were unreasona-
bly broad. The company counterclaimed for an injunction against viola-
tThe following closely related materials have appeared in this Review: Note, Covenants Not
To Compete, 38 N.C.L. REV. 395 (1960); Note, Restraints on Trade-Covenants in Employment
Contracts not to Compete within the Entire United States, 49 N.C.L. REv. 393 (1971); 26 N.C.L.
REv. 402 (1948).
'Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a bargain has added to it a
promise in unreasonable restraint, the former promise is enforceable unless the entire
agreement is part of a plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full performance of a promise
indivisible in terms, would involve unreasonable restraint, the promise is illegal and not
enforceable even for so much of the performance as would be a reasonable restraint.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 518 (1932) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
'See RESTATEMENT § 515.
3  Iowa - , 188 N.W.2d 368 (1971).
'S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1660 (rev. ed.
1937) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
16A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1390 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
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tion of the covenants. The first covenant at issue prohibited the plaintiff
from disclosing his list of the company's customers to third parties or
from using it in a competitive truck rental business after the termination
of his employment. There was no time limit as to the duration of the
restriction. The second restrictive covenant prohibited the plaintiff from
engaging in a competitive business within a 150-mile radius of Water-
loo, Iowa, for a period of two years.
In the course of the plaintiff's employment he had made contacts
on behalf of the company in many-but not all-of the towns around
Waterloo. The plaintiff was the company's principal representative, and
in some instances he was the company's only contact with the custom-
ers. While still employed by the company and without its knowledge,
the plaintiff, in direct violation of both restrictive covenants in his con-
tract, secured verbal commitments from twenty-five per cent of the
company's customers to do business with him after the termination of
his employment.
The defendant showed the need to enforce the covenants to some
extent since the plaintiff, while employed by the company, had gained
access to and influence over the customers.' Secondly, the truck rental
business in the area was highly competitive, and therefore there was no
danger of violating the public policy against monopolies by enforcing
the covenants. 7 A permanent restriction would have been unreasonable,
but rather than completely rejecting the first covenant the court applied
a two-year limitation. Since a period of two years was mentioned in the
second covenant the court had evidence of what the defendant felt was
reasonably necessary to protect itself. By partially enforcing the cove-
nants the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed its former position which was
in line with the so-called majority rule.' Since the court applied the
"partial enforcement" doctrine,9 it implicitly decided that the first cove-
nant would have been held reasonable and thus enforceable had it origi-
nally contained a two-year restriction.
The second covenant was also held to be overly broad. The court's
concern was to protect the defendant from an unfair advantage, but it
determined that to enforce the 150-mile geographic limitation would
have been unfair to the plaintiff. The geographic limitation was consid-
'The burden is on the employer to show this need if the covenant is to be enforced at all.
Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 373.
71d.
'The majority rule is expressed in Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377 (1945).
Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 370.
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ered to be unreasonable since it was not necessary to protect the defen-
dant in cities where the plaintiff had not done business during his em-
ployment. Rather than reject the entire covenant the court enforced
what it found to be a reasonable restriction: the court enjoined the
plaintiff from doing business with those persons or firms which he had
contacted while in the defendant's employ-but left the plaintiff free to
contact those firms, regardless of their location, with which he had had
no business dealings while he represented the defendant.
Restrictive covenants in employment contracts are closely scruti-
nized by the courts because the law frowns on contracts in restraint of
trade;' " in fact the oldest English cases voided all such covenants." The
classical notion was that a man cannot barter away his life and free-
dom, 2 but the modern cases have recognized that some restrictions are
necessary to protect the parties. Restrictive covenants are now generally
enforced if the court finds the restraint reasonably necessary to protect
a legitimate interest of the covenantee in view of its effect on the coven-
antor and the public interest. 3 For example, where A promises B that
he will not work in Chicago but B does business only in New York, the
promise is unreasonable because it does not protect a legitimate interest
of B.'4 Moreover, the legitimate interest of the covenantee must be
weighed against the possible detriment to the covenantor. 5 One who
sells a window-cleaning business does not by working as a janitor with
some window-washing duties violate a covenant against competition,
since to enforce the promise would deprive the seller of his right to work
while enforcing only a questionable interest of the covenantee. 6 In addi-
tion, agreements not to compete are contrary to the public interest
unless they are ancillary to another agreement such as an employment
contract or the sale of a business. 7 Even when construed to be reasona-
"OBlake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 646-51 (1960).
"E.g., Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (1414). See also 5 WILLISTON § 1634.
125 WILLISTON § 1652. See RESTATEMENT § 591; Pechon v. National Corp. Serv., Inc., 234
La. 397, 100 So. 2d 213 (1958) (employment contract for life held no morethan employment at
will).
135 WILLISTON § 1636; RESTATEMENT §§ 515-16.
"45 WILLISTON § 1636, at 4581; see Carpenter & Hughes v. DeJoseph, 217 Misc. 2d 1003, 213
N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1960), modified and aff d. 13 App. Div. 2d 611, 213 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1961)
where a city-wide covenant not to compete with a former employer was held unenforceable, but
the employee was forbidden to solicit his former employer's patients.
13......_ Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 373-74; 5 WILLISTON § 1636, at 4581.
"Mitchell v. National Window Cleaning Co., 155 Ga. 215, 116 S.E. 532 (1923).
"Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 273, 196 N.E.2d 245, 248, 246
N.Y.S.2d 600, 604-05 (1963); Wetzel, Employment Contracts and Noncompetition Agreements,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 61.
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ble these agreements are strictly interpreted, and courts are inclined to
find that an act does not violate a restrictive covenant.' In the United
States the courts are less likely to enforce restrictive covenants in em-
ployment contracts than those in sales contracts because the former are
more likely to injure the promisor and the public. 9
An unreasonable covenant does not necessarily invalidate the entire
contract.20 There are three theories as to the extent of enforceability of
unreasonable covenants. The "all or nothing at all" view, the strictest
of the three, holds that an unreasonable covenant fails completely. For
example, where a covenant prohibited an employee from engaging in
similar work for five years either in the city in which she worked or in
any other city in which the company did business or intended to do
business the court found the restriction to be unreasonable and the entire
covenant failed.2' The geographic limitation was simply too broad to be
enforced by the court.
According to another theory, the covenant fails unless the offensive
term is severable from the rest of the covenant.22 If the restrictions are
separate and distinct so that if the unreasonable term is removed a
gramatically meaningful covenant is left, then the court will enforce the
reasonable term while voiding the "blue-pencilled" term. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina has adopted the "blue-pencil" test. In a case
in which the promise was not to compete in Fayetteville, any other town
in North Carolina, or any other town in the United States where the
company was doing business or intended to do business, the lower
court's application of the "all or nothing at all" rule was reversed. The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that while the nation-wide restric-
tions were clearly unreasonable and unenforceable the city-wide and
state-wide restrictions were severable, and the lower court was ordered
to make a separate determination of their enforceability.23 On the other
hand, an employee's promise not to engage in a business anywhere in
the state except in one city was held indivisible according to the lan-
guage used by the parties since there were no county or city boundaries
along which the covenant could be divided. Therefore the blue-pencil
"Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 272, 196 N.E.2d 245, 247-48, 246
N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (1963); 5 WILLISTON § 1636, at 4583.
1 Iowa at _ 188 N.W.2d at 375; 5 WILLISTON § 1643.
2'Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1959); 5 WILLISTON § 1659.21Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955).
22This is the majority view. Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d at 370.
2Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
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test was not met and the entire covenant was held void. 21 Similarly, an
agreement not to engage in any business whatsoever would be indivisible
and totally invalid.?'
An increasing number of states as well as leading scholars have
rejected the all-or-nothing and blue-pencil tests in favor of the "partial-
enforcement" doctrine."6 This doctrine was expressed by the Ehlers
court as follows: "[U]nless the facts and circumstances indicate bad
faith on the part of the employer we will enforce noncompetitive cove-
nants to the extent they are reasonably necessary to protect his legiti-
mate interests without imposing undue hardship on the employee when
the public interest is not adversely affected '2 7 without regard to the
divisibility of the covenant.
The extent of the relief that will be granted depends upon the
relative equities in each case. In one case a promise by an employee not
to compete with his employer's laundry business for ten years was held
to be unreasonable, but the court enforced a restraint against soliciting
customers for a period of nine months as being reasonable based on
fairness and justice.21 Similarly, where a defendant had managed the
plaintiff's lumberyard under an employment contract containing a cove-
nant not to work for another lumberyard within fifteen miles for ten
years after the termination of employment and the defendant opened a
competing business in the same town, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
decided that a three-year limitation would probably be sufficient to
protect the plaintiff's interests. 29 The courts that follow the older theo-
ries refuse to look beyond the terms which the parties themselves have
written, while under the partial-enforcement doctrine the courts feel free
to modify the agreement and enforce instead a restriction that is reason-
able.
The proponents of the older theories believe that the partial-
enforcement doctrine ignores certain fundamental contract principles.
It has been argued that there is a basic presumption against agreements
in restraint of trade and that when a restrictive term is unreasonable it
is because a party has grasped for too much. Therefore, according to
2 Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N.E. 1048 (1895); 5 WILLISTON
§ 1659, at 4680-81.
25 WILLISTON § 1659, at 4681.
"Id. § 1660; 6A CORBIN § 1390. The major cases are listed in Ehlers. - Iowa at -. , 188
N.W.2d at 370.
2.. Iowa at __, 188 N.W.2d at 370.
2Schmidl v. Central Laundry & Supply Co., Inc., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
"Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955)
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this view, it is better to eliminate the restriction altogether." According
to the blue-pencil test the covenant reflects the intent of the contracting
parties, and the court's modification of an indivisible covenant is, in
effect, the imposition of what the court feels is "right" for the parties.
The court virtually rewrites the contract.' The partial-enforcement
doctrine dilutes these basic contract principles and allows the employer
to overreach, secure in the knowledge that the covenant will be enforced
to some extent.3 This knowledge impairs the ideal situation because it
destroys the bargaining power of the employee; that is, the employer will
know that he runs no risk and therefore will insist upon the harshest
terms. 33 The older views insist that when the court is allowed to rewrite
the contract the result will depend on subjective considerations that can
only lead to vagueness and uncertainty as to the respective duties of the
parties. According to Ehlers a court must find what is reasonably
necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests without undue
hardship to the employee and without adversely affecting the public
interest.34 A test under which these factors are weighed is so vague and
open-ended as to be likely to result in a manifestation of the court's
values and not the parties' intention.
On the other hand, advocates of the partial-enforcement doctrine
have argued that its application leads to more equitable results without
disregarding the intentions of the parties. The blue-pencil rule has been
attacked as legalistic, mechanical, and leading to contradictory re-
sults.3 5 The legality of contracts ought not depend solely on form.
Under the blue-pencil rule it is argued that two contracts could have the
same meaning but only one would be enforceable because the writing
happened to be susceptible to deletion of the offensive terms while leav-
ing a grammatically meaningful promise.36
One authority has noted that most unreasonable covenants, al-
though illegal and unenforceable, are not the product of moral turpi-
tude; rather they result usually from a desire, however overly zealous,
to protect a party's own interests. Therefore there is no reason to punish
the party by throwing out the entire covenant and affording him no
"'See - Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 376 (Becker, J., dissenting).
31 d. (interpretation should not involve rewriting contract); see Hamilton v. Wosepka. 261
Iowa 299, 312-13, 154 N.W.2d 164, 168 (1967).
L... Iowa at __, 188 N.W.2d at 376-77; 5 WILLISTON § 1660, at 4685.
3.. Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 376.
3L...._ Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 370.
.. _Iowa at , 188 N.W.2d at 371; 6A CORBIN § 1390, at 67.
365 WILLISTO N § 1660, at 4683.
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protection at all.37
The advocates of the all-or-nothing doctrine argue that the partial-
enforcement doctrine ignores the intent of the parties, but this argument
has two sides. The courts should not destroy a freely bargained contract
any more than is necessary to satisfy the various public policies.38 The
partial-enforcement doctrine gives effect to the parties' intentions to the
extent that the law would allow. It is further argued that the public
interest is best served and the sanctity of the contract is best preserved
by reducing the restriction to an enforceable level. The dividing line
between the unreasonable covenant and the enforceable covenant is
easily ascertainable.39 Even under the all-or-nothing doctrine the courts
must decide that the restriction is too severe to be reasonable." Under
the partial-enforcement doctrine the standard of reasonableness is en-
forced rather than just used as the standard of enforceability.
The partial-enforcement doctrine does not totally disregard the
intentions of the parties. When a party accepts a restraint, for instance,
over an unenforceably large area it is obviously reasonable to treat him
as having accepted a lesser and reasonable geographical restriction.4 '
Arguably, then, the application of the partial-enforcement doctrine does
not involve rewriting the contract in contravention of the intention of
the parties.12 In Ehlers, for example, by applying the two-year limitation
already contained in the second covenant to the first covenant, which
otherwise was unreasonable because it was of indefinite duration, the
court enforced a standard that the parties had implicitly agreed upon.
A similar result was reached when the court enforced the geographical
restriction only as to a class of customers and not as to all customers
within the 150-mile radius.
The inflexible all-or-nothing and blue-pencil theories allow parties
to escape their contractual responsibilities.4 3 When an overly broad
covenant falls entirely the covenantee is left without any protection,
while the covenantor is permitted to retain the entire contract considera-
:Corbin, A Comment on Beit v. Belt, 23 CONN. B.J. 43, 47 (1949).
" Williston, A Note on Belt v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 40, 42 (1949).
" Corbin, supra note 37, at 47.
"The concept of reasonableness must be an underlying value in any such determination. When
a court decides that a covenant is reasonable it also decides that it is not unreasonable. Similarly,
when the court decides that a covenant is unreasonable, it can easily go one step further and decide
what is reasonable.
4
'Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 582, 264 A.2d 53, 59 (1970).
"Corbin, supra note 37, at 50.
"Id. at 47.
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
tion unless separate consideration was exacted for the covenant. He
would then be free to open a business next-door to his former em-
ployer.44
A final argument in favor of the partial-enforcement doctrine is
that it does not involve rewriting the contract any more than does the
majority blue-pencil rule. 5 Under each theory the contract is modified
by the court to make it enforceable. The blue-pencil theory involves a
mere mechanical excission of the offending term, while the partial-
enforcement doctrine goes one step further and assures that the rewrit-
ing by the court leads to the most equitable results under the circum-
stances.
The conflicting views will certainly collide when the American Law
Institute reconsiders the blue-pencil rule set out in section 518 of the
Restatement of Contracts. If the ALI adopts the partial-enforcement
rule, as it likely will, another issue that must be resolved is whether that
rule should apply only to employment contracts and not to contracts of
sale. The Ehlers court endorsed such a limitation, but the present section
518 makes no such distinction.
An employment contract is likely to be a contract of adhesion with
the parties in positions of unequal bargaining power."6 In the sales situa-
tion the parties are more likely to have bargained for each term. Some
have argued that for this very reason the all-or-nothing doctrine should
be applied to contracts of employment to prevent the employer from
overreaching with the expectation of at least partial enforcemeni.14 This
argument is countered by the requirement of the partial-enforcement
doctrine that the covenant be made in good faith if it is to be enforced
at all.48 Since the concept of reasonableness is equally ascertainable in
the sales and employment situations, there would seem to be no need
for a distinction if the premises of the partial-enforcement doctrine are
sound. The partial-enforcement doctrine requires an examination by the
court of the surrounding circumstances so that whatever considerations
are peculiar to either the sales or the employment situation will be
considered when deciding what is reasonable and enforceable in each
case.
49
44Id. at 50; see Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161 (1948); 6A CORBIN § 1390, at 76.
16A CORBIN § 1390, at 68-69.
111d. § 1394, at 89.
4.__ Iowa at -, 188 N.W.2d at 376-77 (Becker, J., dissenting); 5 WILLISTON § 1660, at
4685.
"'See - Iowa at _, 188 N.W.2d at 370.
"In the sales situation the UNIFOPNI COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(i) allows an unconscionable
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If adopted the partial-enforcement doctrine will support the equi-
ties of each situation rather than mechanically apply legalistic rules of
interpretation. As stated in Ehlers, the result will be that the legitimate
interests of the covenantee will be protected without undue hardship to
the covenantor when the public interest is not adversely affected. 0 This
balancing of conflicting interests will enable the courts to dispense jus-
tice rather than act as legal technicians.
DAVID M. RAPP
Sales-Strict Liability For Breach of Warranty: Gore v. George J. Ball,
Inc.
As a general rule two parties may deal with each other as they wish,
and if their ensuing agreement is voluntarily and fairly entered into, it
will be enforceable in a court of law. However, this fundamental right
of freedom of contract is subject to the limitation, inter alia, that the
agreement may not be against public policy. The vague and somewhat
amorphous concept of public policy has been applied by courts to invali-
date contracts which in the opinion of the court tend to be injurious to
the public welfare, to sound morality, or to the interests of society.' In
Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc.,2 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
fused to enforce a limitation-of-damages clause in a contract between a
seed seller and a farmer because such a provision "is contrary to the
public policy of this State."'3
In 1965, using an order blank obtained from a George J. Ball, Inc.
catalogue, C. 0. Gore ordered four ounces of Heinz 1350 tomato seeds
at a cost of five dollars. Shortly thereafter Gore received from Ball
several packets of seed labeled "Heinz 1350 Tomato Seed." Included
contract or clause to be enforced according to any one of the three theories:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
OSee text accompanying note 27 supra.
'E.g., Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892); Perkins v. Hegg, 212 Minn. 377, 3
N.W.2d 671 (1942).
2279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389 (1971).
31d. at 203, 182 S.E.2d at 395.
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